Cambodia\u27s 1998 Elections: The Failure of Democratic Consolidation by Manikas, Peter M. & Bjornlund, Eric
New England Journal of Public Policy
Volume 14
Issue 1 Transitions in Emerging Democracies Article 11
9-23-1998
Cambodia's 1998 Elections: The Failure of
Democratic Consolidation
Peter M. Manikas
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
Eric Bjornlund
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Political History Commons, and the Political Science
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been accepted for inclusion in New England Journal of
Public Policy by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu.
Recommended Citation
Manikas, Peter M. and Bjornlund, Eric (1998) "Cambodia's 1998 Elections: The Failure of Democratic Consolidation," New England
Journal of Public Policy: Vol. 14: Iss. 1, Article 11.
Available at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp/vol14/iss1/11
Cambodia's 1998 The Failure of
Elections Democratic
Consolidation
Peter M. Manikas
Eric Bjornlund
This article examines why Cambodia 's transition to democracy faltered in the
years that followed the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia period
despite the international community's assistance to two "democratic" elections.
Cambodia's parliamentary elections on July 26, 1998, were supposed to consolidate
the political gains made since 1991, when the signing of the Paris Peace Accords
ended the nation's twelve-year civil war. More than five years earlier, in May 1993,
elections organized by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC) — held at a cost of $ 1 .5 billion and the lives of seventy-eight people de-
ployed to Cambodia under UNTAC auspices 1 — ushered in a coalition government that
had been expected to establish a legal and political framework for the democratic gov-
ernance of the country. While the election was largely hailed as a success at the time,
that coalition unraveled over the next five years. By July 1997, a violent coup had over-
turned the elected government and the nation once again confronted civil violence and
international isolation.
The 1998 elections, like the UN-supervised elections five years earlier, failed to
mend Cambodia's deep-seated political divisions. Indeed, the nation now looks much as
it did when it emerged from the UNTAC period. The Cambodian People's Party (CPP).
with roots in Vietnamese communism, is in control of the civil bureaucracy, security
forces, and electronic media; key opposition leaders returned from exile only recently
and are participating in a fragile coalition government. The human rights of political
activists are far from secure.
The Paris Peace Agreements and the 1993 Elections
Perhaps no country in the twentieth century has suffered more turmoil and unremitting
violence than Cambodia. The nation has seen little peace, and no stability, during the
past fifty years. Since the end of the Second World War, each of Cambodia's govern-
ments has been an abrupt departure from the one that preceded it: in 1953 the French
Peter M. Manikas, a senior associate at the National Democratic Institute for Interna-
tional Affairs and its representative in Cambodia from May 1996 through May 1997, was a
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colonial regime was replaced by the monarchy of King Norodom Sihanouk; the king
was overthrown by his prime minister, Lon Nol, in 1970; the Lon Nol regime was
toppled by the Khmer Rouge in 1975; the Maoist Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, were
conquered by the invading Vietnamese army in 1978; and in 1991, the Vietnamese-
installed regime, after fighting a protracted civil war against the Khmer Rouge as well
as against the royalist and nationalist forces encamped along the Thai border, was re-
placed by the United Nations-sponsored transitional government.
The Vietnamese invasion of December 1978 installed the People's Republic of
Kampuchea (PRK), which faced a continuing struggle against the Khmer Rouge. The
PRK, which consisted mostly of former Khmer Rouge cadre who had defected to Viet-
nam to escape the purges launched by Pol Pot shortly after taking power, was led by
Heng Samrin and, after 1985, by Hun Sen. Defeated in battle, the Pol Pot-led guerrillas
had fled into hiding along the Thai-Cambodia frontier. In 1982, the Khmer Rouge en-
tered into an alliance with the royalist National Front for an independent, neutral,
peaceful, and cooperative Cambodia (known by its French acronym, FUNCINPEC),
headed by King Sihanouk, and later by his son, Prince Ranariddh. A third alliance
member, the republican Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), was led
by Son Sann, a highly respected former prime minister in Sihanouk's 1960s govern-
ment. Each of the warring factions secured the backing of its Cold War patrons: the
USSR supporting its ally Vietnam, and therefore the PRK; China backing the Khmer
Rouge; and the Western countries, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions, assisting FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF.
The Cold War, still raging in the early and mid-1980s, stymied occasional attempts
to bring an end to the conflict. The thaw of the late 1980s, however, finally led to a
breakthrough. The Vietnamese withdrew their forces in 1989, and the PRK changed its
name to the State of Cambodia (SOC), preparing for its new non-Communist image.
That same year, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, along with
other interested parties, initiated the Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia.
The 1991 Paris Peace Agreement obligated the United States, Japan, China, and the
other signatories of the 1991 Paris Accords to support the struggle for democracy in
Cambodia. These agreements required Cambodia to respect human rights as enshrined
in the principal international instruments on human rights. The Paris Accords called for
Cambodia to follow "a system of liberal democracy on the basis of pluralism." The
accords also mandated "periodic and genuine elections . . . with a requirement that
electoral procedures provide a full and fair opportunity to organize and participate in
the electoral process."2
The agreement established the largest and most costly peacekeeping force in the
history of the United Nations: the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia.
UNTAC was to supervise the administration of the country until a democratically
elected Constituent Assembly formed a new government and ratified a national consti-
tution. With a budget of more than $2 billion (of which $1.5 billion was actually
spent), 3 UNTAC consisted of more than 20,000 foreign personnel, including 15,000
people serving in its military component.
UNTAC's mandate was a broad one. It was given "all powers necessary to ensure
implementation" of the comprehensive agreement. In the military area, UNTAC's spe-
cific task was to "supervise, monitor, and verify" the cease-fire, the withdrawal of for-
eign troops, and the cantonment and disarmament of the four warring factions: the
SOC, the Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC, and the KPNLF. 4
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UNTAC's civil responsibilities, too, were extensive. They included supervising the
repatriation of refugees, conducting elections, and implementing programs to protect
human rights. UNTAC was also responsible for exercising direct control over adminis-
trative bodies in the areas of foreign affairs, national defense, public security, finance,
and public information. Additionally, it was to "supervise or control" other, less sensi-
tive public activities. Its fundamental objective, though, was to "ensure a neutral politi-
cal environment conducive to free and fair elections."
During the May 23-28, 1993, elections, nearly 4 million Cambodians, almost 90
percent of all registered voters, went to the polls. Representatives were elected on a
proportional basis, with each of the nation's twenty-one provinces serving as an election
district. The UN established 1 ,400 stationary and mobile polling stations, and personnel
from more than forty countries supervised the voting. UNTAC, working with national
nongovernmental organizations (NGO)s , conducted an extensive civic education cam-
paign to assure citizens that their vote would be secret. To protect the secrecy of the
ballot at the village level, counting was conducted at provincial centers where ballots
from several villages were commingled to obscure voting patterns in any given locality.
Expectations that the Khmer Rouge would interrupt the voting did not materialize.
Intimidation and violence, however, did mar the campaign. The CPP was accused of
intimidating candidates and voters, denying opposition parties fair media access, and
other forms of harassment. Several opposition activists, primarily FUNCINPEC sup-
porters, were murdered during the campaign. Most of the political violence was attrib-
uted to the Khmer Rouge, but a substantial portion of the violence also was found to be
the responsibility of the CPP. 5
To some extent, the violence that flared was the responsibility of all the major con-
testing parties. FUNCINPEC candidates, for example, also appealed to people's preju-
dices against the resident Vietnamese population, many of whom had been in the coun-
try for generations. As a result, the Vietnamese community was also the target of politi-
cal violence.
Although twenty parties registered, only four of them won seats in the Constituent
Assembly. Of the 120 seats in the assembly, FUNCINPEC obtained 58 (45.5 percent of
the total vote); the Cambodian People's Party 51 (38.2 percent ); and the Buddhist Lib-
eral Democratic Party (BLDP), the civilian arm of the KPNLF, won 10 (3.7 percent). A
much smaller party, Molinaka, won one seat.
The euphoria that accompanied the election, however, soon subsided. His unex-
pected loss led Hun Sen to reject the results, claiming that the UN had rigged the elec-
tion against him. Rumors of a possible coup appeared even as the ballots were being
counted, and CPP leaders threatened secession in eight eastern provinces bordering on
Vietnam. The pending crisis was averted only when King Sihanouk brokered a power-
sharing agreement.
A coalition government was formed which, if it did not reflect the election's out-
come, at least mirrored the realities of political power. After the election, the CPP re-
mained in control of the civil bureaucracy, police, and other key components of the
state apparatus. Therefore, FUNCINPEC needed the CPP's cooperation in order to gov-
ern effectively. In addition, Cambodia's Constitution required that the new government
be approved by two-thirds of the National Assembly. Clearly, a compromise would be
needed to form the government. Consequently, the CPP and FUNCINPEC agreed to
share the top government positions. Although FUNCINPEC won a plurality of the par-
liamentary seats, each of the eighteen government ministries would be headed by
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co-ministers, one from each party, or by a minister and a secretary of state from differ-
ent parties. The government that emerged was quickly termed a government of national
reconciliation. At the time, the new government was seen as the product of a successful
international intervention.
National reconciliation was needed because long-standing animosities continued to
divide the country. Many still viewed the CPP as a "puppet" of the Vietnamese and
therefore a threat to Khmer culture. The National Front FUNCINPEC, on the other
hand, suffered under several handicaps despite the nation's respect for the king, and by
extension for Prince Ranariddh. Many of the party's members of Parliament (MPs) were
seen as venal opportunists. Resentment lingered because several FUNCINPEC officials
were allowed to retain their foreign passports, usually issued by the United States or
France, which they obtained during their years in exile. In the minds of many Cambodi-
ans, these links with foreign countries cast doubt on the MPs' commitment to improving
the lives of ordinary Cambodians.
As the new government assumed office, UNTAC's legacy was becoming increasingly
clear. The civil war had ended, the Khmer Rouge was politically marginalized, and
375,000 refugees had returned. With the high rate of registration and voter turnout, the
election was technically a success. Furthermore, UNTAC had sponsored dozens of new
nongovernmental organizations engaged in monitoring human rights, civic education,
and social services. In addition, several newspapers were operating free of direct gov-
ernment control.
UNTAC, however, failed to accomplish several important tasks. During the election,
in provinces such as Battambang, Siem Reap, and Kompong Thorn, UNTAC had been
unable to prevent considerable harassment and violence. This included the arrest and
intimidation of party activists, the bombing of party offices, and the execution of oppo-
sition supporters, a pattern that was to repeat itself five years later. Also, the military
forces of the opposing sides had been neither demobilized nor disarmed. While the
forces of the former warring factions were incorporated into an army under unified
command, troops, in fact, remained loyal to their former political leaders, and divisions
were widely known to be aligned with either FUNCINPEC or the CPP.
UNTAC also failed to fulfill its principal mandate to "ensure a neutral political envi-
ronment." Throughout the campaign period, and after the election as well, the CPP
maintained firm control of the civil bureaucracy, judiciary, police, and much of the
military. These instruments of state power were used by the CPP during the election
period to retain its hold on government.
The Coalition Unravels
Cambodia made some progress in the early part of its experiment with democracy. The
newly seated Constituent Assembly, for instance, transformed itself into a legislative
chamber, adopted a new Constitution, and passed much-needed laws spurring foreign
investment. The government made improvements in the country's infrastructure and
advances in the areas of education and health care. There were also significant develop-
ments in Cambodian civil society, marked by the growth of independent media and the
emergence of strong and nongovernmental organizations. A number of these NGOs
actively sought to strengthen human rights, improve the legal system, enhance the status
of women, and educate the public about democracy.
After the UNTAC period, however, turmoil within the parties clouded the political
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landscape. A power struggle within the Cambodian People's Party, for example, was
reportedly behind an attempted coup d'etat in July 1994. In 1995, the Buddhist Liberal
Democratic Party splintered. Hun Sen's CPP backed a new faction of BLDP led by
information minister Ieng Mouly.
By 1995, problems had emerged within FUNCINPEC, weakening the party as a
coalition partner. Sam Rainsy, for example, who served as finance minister, was widely
regarded as one of FUNCINPEC's most capable members. An outspoken critic of the
widespread corruption that infected all levels of government, Rainsy v/as removed from
his post and expelled from the party. He later established the Khmer Nation Party
(KNP), subsequently renamed the Sam Rainsy Party, an effective competitor in the
1998 elections. Following Sam Rainsy's ouster, Prince Sirivudh, the king's half brother
and FUNCINPEC secretary-general, was forced out of the party and pushed into exile
in France, accused of plotting to assassinate Hun Sen. With the departure of Rainsy and
Sirivudh, two of the party's most competent political operatives were unavailable to
help the increasingly beleaguered and outmaneuvered Prince Ranariddh.
During this time, the fragile coalition begin to unravel. Animosity between the co-
prime ministers led to political stalemate, which prevented the government from under-
taking the political and social reforms needed to establish its legitimacy. Independent
judicial institutions required by the Constitution — the Constitutional Council and
Supreme Council of the Magistracy — were never established. The CPP retained full
control of the judiciary, local administration, and the security forces. Endemic corrup-
tion persisted as well.
Likewise, newspapers critical of the CPP or the government were closed and their
editors imprisoned. Between 1993 and 1997, several journalists were prosecuted, killed,
or injured, apparently the result of politically motivated attacks. In addition, opposition
political party workers were threatened and harassed.
In March 1997, an apparent assassination attempt on Sam Rainsy at a public rally in
front of the National Assembly in Phnom Penh killed at least sixteen people and injured
more than one hundred. The attack, widely attributed to Hun Sen's bodyguard detail,
was a turning point. To many observers, the political impasse now seemed increasingly
likely to be resolved by violence.
The following month, Hun Sen made an attempt to divide the opposition internally
by encouraging FUNCINPEC MPs to defect to the CPP. The CPP reportedly used in-
timidation and bribes to recruit the dozen defectors, but it was not long before most
returned to the National Front FUNCINPEC. Nevertheless, the CPP had managed to
increase its numbers in Parliament and now had an effective majority. It still fell short,
however, of the two-thirds majority necessary to adopt constitutional amendments. 6
The upcoming 1998 elections were also generating increased tensions. Realizing that
FUNCINPEC had little influence over local administration, and that control over local
offices in the countryside would be important in the parliamentary elections, Ranariddh
sought a new district-level power-sharing agreement. The parties failed to reach an
accord, each blaming the other for bargaining in bad faith.
Although required by the Paris Peace Accords, the parties never merged their mili-
tary forces into a single national army and maintained large armed militias and "body-
guard units." Both the CPP and FUNCINPEC competed to recruit defecting Khmer
Rouge soldiers to their sides. Independent judicial institutions mandated by the Consti-
tution were not established. Even before the July 1997 coup, many Cambodian citizens
questioned their government's commitment to democracy, had lost faith in the
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democratic process, and doubted the possibility of meaningful elections. Despite these
trends, however, until July 1997 the principles of a multiparty government stood.
July 1997 Coup and Aftermath
On July 5, 1997, second prime minister Hun Sen launched a coup d'etat against
Cambodia's first prime minister, Prince Ranariddh, overturning the lawful government.
For two days forces loyal to Hun Sen routed troops loyal to Prince Ranariddh. After the
coup, Hun Sen quickly consolidated his power by disarming and detaining nearly all
military, police, and intelligence forces loyal to the prince and dismantling the political
infrastructures of parties opposed to the CPP throughout the country. In the days follow-
ing the coup, dozens of Ranariddh's key supporters and other FUNCINPEC loyalists
were killed, including senior interior ministry official Ho Sok, who was executed on the
grounds of the ministry. Offices of parties opposed to the CPP were sacked and burned.
Meanwhile, Prince Ranariddh fled to France, while many of his party's stalwarts found
exile in Bangkok.
In August, Hun Sen consolidated his control when the National Assembly formally
deposed the prince as co-prime minister, stripped him of his parliamentary immunity,
and namedHun Sen's ally, foreign minister Ung Huot, as the new first prime minister. A
military court subsequently charged Ranariddh with smuggling arms and colluding with
the outlawed Khmer Rouge guerrilla group.
For months after the coup, fighting between forces of the Cambodian People's Party
government and troops loyal to Prince Ranariddh continued along the northwestern
border between Cambodia and Thailand. An estimated 60,000 Cambodians fled to refu-
gee camps in Thailand.
Prince Ranariddh and other exiled political leaders formed the Union of Cambodian
Democrats (UCD). FUNCINPEC joined the alliance with three other political parties
opposed to the current government: the Khmer Nation Party of Sam Rainsy, the BLDP
led by Son Sann, and the Khmer Neutral Party, a small party that had no seats in Parlia-
ment.
In retrospect, the July coup should not have been too surprising. Other coup attempts
had been made between 1993 and 1997. In addition, the previous year had seen the
rivalry between Hun Sen and Ranariddh grow increasingly intense and militant. Begin-
ning in August 1996, the two co-prime ministers competed fiercely for the allegiance of
the Khmer Rouge defectors. The first to desert was Ieng Sary, Pol Pot's brother-in-law,
who was largely regarded as being very near the top of the Khmer Rouge hierarchy.
Hun Sen prevailed, offering Ieng Sary and his followers a royal pardon and effective
control of Pailin. However, the defections of other Khmer Rouge leaders continued, as
did the competition for their support. Hun Sen and Ranariddh dispatched emissaries to
lure defectors to their respective sides. To the co-prime ministers, the dissidents poten-
tially offered disciplined and experienced guerilla fighters and perhaps whatever funds
from illegal gem and timber operations had been stashed in Swiss bank accounts. 7 In
November 1996 and February 1997, FUNCINPEC and CPP military units in Battam-
bang clashed. Although the skirmishes were brief, they served as a reminder, if one was
needed, that the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces was not truly a national army.
International Response
The international response to Hun Sen's coup lacked coherence. The United States
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suspended all but the humanitarian assistance portion of its $38 million foreign assis-
tance program. Germany followed suit, and Japan, Cambodia's largest donor, suspended
aid but quickly resumed it. France continued to provide aid to Cambodia but also stated
that credible elections in 1998 were critical. The International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank, citing government corruption and Cambodia's failure to comply with a
structural adjustment program, rather than referring to the coup, suspended aid and a
$120 million IMF loan package. 8
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) condemned the coup and
postponed Cambodia's pending membership until after elections. ASEAN — together
with an informal diplomatic grouping known as the Friends of Cambodia, which in-
cluded Australia, China, France, India, Russia, and the United States — urged Hun Sen
and the exiled political leaders to come to an agreement on the conditions under which
the exiles would return to Cambodia so that the national elections scheduled for 1998
could be "free, fair, and credible."9
In September 1997, the United Nations accreditation committee decided that
Cambodia's seat in the General Assembly should remain vacant. By leaving it empty,
the UN withheld its recognition of the new government in Phnom Penh, a significant
victory for the leaders in exile. The United Nations also played an important role in
attempting to arrange for the return of the exiled political leaders by securing from Hun
Sen guarantees for their safety and freedom. The UN provided international monitors to
help protect returning political leaders.
The UCD in exile received support from the international community, including the
U.S.-based National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the Inter-
national Republican Institute (IRI). 10 This assistance was designed to enable the UCD to
stay together long enough to develop a strategy for negotiating its return. Under pres-
sure from the international community, the Hun Sen regime agreed to several of the
opposition's demands; if the exiles returned there would be guarantees for their safety,
international assistance for new elections, and UN monitors to help ensure the election's
fairness.
New elections were eventually scheduled for July 1998. Coaxed back from exile by
the international donors in the aftermath of the coup, the opposition agreed to partici-
pate in an election in which the playing field was far from level. UN human rights
monitors, for example, continued to document numerous instances of violence and
intimidation directed against opposition supporters in Cambodia's rural countryside. 11
Khmer Nation Party leader Sam Rainsy returned to the country briefly in late Novem-
ber. Leaders and supporters of FUNCINPEC, the BLDP, and the KNP returned in Janu-
ary and February.
Hun Sen threatened Prince Ranariddh with prosecution for smuggling weapons and
colluding with the outlawed Khmer Rouge. If convicted, he would have been ineligible
to stand for election. Under the terms of a Japanese-brokered agreement, however, the
prince was tried in absentia, received a royal pardon, and returned to Cambodia in late
March.
In the months before the elections, Sam Rainsy and Prince Ranariddh threatened on
several occasions to pull their parties out of the election unless several conditions were
met, including a cease-fire in the ongoing fighting in the northwest, fair access to
broadcast media, dismantling of pro-government militia in the provinces, reestablishing
the National Election Commission (NEC), and convening the Constitutional Council.
Nevertheless, even though their demands were never met, they stayed in the race.
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The 1998 Elections: A Flawed Climate and Framework
On July 26, 1998, Hun Sen's CPP prevailed at the polls by winning an absolute majority
of the parliamentary seats, with some 42 percent of the ballots cast. Together, the two
major opposition parties, the National Front FUNCINPEC and the Sam Rainsy Party,
received 45 percent (31 percent and 14 percent, respectively). This translated into 64
seats for the CPP, 43 for FUNCINPEC, and 15 for the Sam Rainsy Party. International
and domestic election observers praised the process as it unfolded on election day. Nev-
ertheless, the opposition rejected the electoral results, claiming that fraud and "serious
irregularities" robbed them of their victory.
Viewed in its entirety, the election process in Cambodia fell far short of democratic
norms.
12 As agreed by virtually all international and domestic observers, the voting
process itself was generally well administered and the atmosphere on election day was
largely peaceful. In the face of serious obstacles, the Cambodian people turned out in
high numbers on election day. But while balloting and initial stages of the vote count
went relatively well, both the political climate and the institutional framework for the
elections were highly flawed.
Political Environment in Pre-election Period
In the months leading up to the 1998 elections, violence and intimidation plagued Cam-
bodia. After the July 1997 coup, dozens of opposition members of Parliament and party
leaders fled the country in fear for their lives. Cambodian political parties, election
monitoring groups, human rights organizations, and the UN Center for Human Rights
documented the systematic and widespread political intimidation and violence that
plagued the pre-election environment. The UN documented dozens of politically moti-
vated summary executions, and "disappearances," following the July 1997 coup. 13 The
UN special representative for human rights submitted reports to the Cambodian govern-
ment, but no action was taken by Cambodian officials to apprehend those responsible
for human rights violations.
In the aftermath of the coup, second prime minister Hun Sen and the CPP dismantled
the infrastructures of opposition political parties. During the months that the opposition
was in exile, Hun Sen and the CPP were able to campaign without competition. When
opposition leaders were later allowed to return to Cambodia in the months before the
1998 election, they had to operate within a framework designed and dominated by the
CPP. Opposition parties were not given sufficient time to rebuild their party member-
ship networks, and CPP resources dwarfed those of the opposition. Prince Ranariddh
attracted large crowds when he campaigned in provincial capitals, but reports of politi-
cal violence directed against opposition party workers in the rural countryside persisted.
After the July 1997 coup, the CPP took advantage of the opposition's absence to
further consolidate its control over the military, security forces, civil administration,
and media. The media limited their coverage of opposition candidates throughout the
campaign period. News coverage of rallies, speeches, and other campaign events was
heavily biased toward the ruling party. Moreover, limited access to broadcast media
impeded the ability of opposition parties to reach potential voters and gave the CPP a
substantial advantage. Each of the thirty-nine registered political parties was allowed
one five-minute slot per day. This diluted the media access of the two major opposition
parties, FUNCINPEC and the Sam Rainsy Party, which received no more time than the
parties that had no prior history and little demonstrable public support.
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Institutional Framework
The legal and institutional framework lacked the credibility necessary for democratic
elections. The process of enacting the election law and regulations and of establishing
the National Election Commission and Constitutional Council effectively ensured rul-
ing party control of election administration and dispute resolution. Those institutions
had little credibility with much of the public and the international community when
they addressed the election disputes that later arose.
Furthermore, the opposition had no opportunity to participate in the development of
the election law or the appointment of the bodies to oversee the elections and resolve
disputes. While opposition members of Parliament and other political leaders were still
in exile, the Cambodian People's Party controlled the National Assembly and enacted
the election law and appointed the NEC members.
The way in which the members of the National Election Commission were selected
raised serious questions about its independence and ultimately its credibility. Under the
new election law, the eleven-member NEC was to include representatives from each of
the parties represented in theNational Assembly and from the NGO sector. But party
seats were given to ruling party-backed factions of opposition parties. In addition, NGO
leaders questioned the impartiality of the NGO representative.
The Constitutional Council, which was supposed to function as the final arbiter of
constitutional and election-related disputes, was not properly constituted. CPP-ap-
pointed members controlled the Constitutional Council, and the council failed to meet
in the pre-election period to address serious and fundamental election-related disputes.
As previously noted, the Cambodian Constitution requires the support of two-thirds
of the members of Parliament to form a government. Thus, the party receiving a plural-
ity or even a majority had to obtain the support of one or more of the other parties. The
CPP, then, had to form a government with FUNCINPEC or the Sam Rainsy Party, and
Ranariddh was asked by Hun Sen to participate in the new government. The prince
refused for several months, precipitating a constitutional crisis.
The combined opposition received substantially more votes than the CPP. If
FUNCINPEC and the Sam Rainsy Party had merged before the elections they would
have garnered a plurality and had the right to designate the new prime minister. More-
over, because the new government needed a two-thirds vote of confidence from the
recently elected National Assembly members, the opposition had the power to deny the
CPP the ability to form a government in accordance with the Constitution. Neither
event occurred. The opposition, effectively unable to collaborate on a strategy, seem-
ingly was politically paralyzed.
Problems in the Post-Election Period
After the elections, the National Front FUNCINPEC and the Sam Rainsy Party submit-
ted approximately 800 formal complaints to the NEC. They alleged, among other
things, problems with the vote count, including the fact that many party agents were
intimidated and denied access to the count. In response, the NEC, between July 30 and
August 4, conducted a recount in eight of the country's fifteen hundred communes. On
August 5 an NEC spokesperson claimed that the alleged problems were not substanti-
ated and announced that the commission was ceasing all operations. The NEC also
refused to provide official rejection notices to the complainants. This, in turn, jeopar-
dized the parties' ability to take some complaints to the Constitutional Council.
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The Constitutional Council refused to accept complaints about intimidation of oppo-
sition party agents, alleged electoral fraud, and the formula by which seals were allo-
cated. It stated that these complaints were either formally rejected by the NEC or not
filed before the deadline. The council's refusal to consider these complaints, coupled
with the NEC's failure to provide the required rejection notices, foreclosed any mean-
ingful opportunity for appeal.
On the day following the election, a controversy involving the formula for allocating
National Assembly seats erupted. Versions of the electoral regulations published on
May 6 and May 25 clearly indicated that one particular formula would be used. These
regulations were not marked as drafts and were widely circulated to party representa-
tives. After a meeting of the NEC on May 29, another version of the regulations, carry-
ing that date, was circulated in early June. It subsequently become clear from NEC
records and from the accounts of individual commissioners that the NEC neither dis-
cussed nor properly adopted a new formula, but the new regulations included the
change. No particular effort, such as a letter to parties or a press statement, was made to
highlight this significant alteration, and evidently no one from the opposition parties,
domesticmonitoring groups, international observer organizations, and the diplomatic
community was aware that a change had been made. The new formula gave the CPP
five additional seats, compared with what the ruling party would have received under
the previous formula. This was sufficient to provide the CPP with a majority, 64 seats in
the new 122-seat National Assembly.
There was evidence that NEC advisers, in adopting the new formula, were merely
trying to correct what they believed to be a technical mistake. The opposition's other
allegations of fraud in the balloting and counting did not appear to be significant
enough in their totality to have affected the overall outcome of the election. But since
the NEC and the Constitutional Council were seen as lacking independence, their re-
sponses to the opposition's complaints were viewed with suspicion by the press, Cam-
bodian NGOs, the Cambodian public, and the international community.
Violence and Intimidation after the Elections
Instability and violence resumed after the elections. Grenade attacks on Hun Sen's
compound, the violent suppression of street demonstrations, and the killing and disap-
pearance of opposition figures formed the backdrop to the pending negotiations on the
formation of the government. Chaos threatened to take hold as ruling and opposition
party leaders jockeyed for position in advance of discussions about whether, and on
what terms, FUNCINPEC would join the government.
On September 8, the government issued the first of two orders that prohibited about
300 people, including all the new opposition members of Parliament, all outgoing oppo-
sition MPs, and several FUNCINPEC senior civil servants, from leaving the country.
The ban was justified as a means of keeping suspects allegedly involved in grenade
attacks and demonstrations in the country. The UN Human Rights Center condemned
this travel ban as a violation of the Cambodian Constitution, the fundamental right to
freedom of travel, and an express commitment of the Cambodian government to the UN
secretary-general
.
The post-election chaos, initiated by demands for an investigation of election-related
complaints, might well have been avoided if there had been credible and functioning
institutions to administer the grievance process. But the institutions charged with re-
sponsibility to resolve disputes largely failed to effectively address the opposition's
concerns.
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Domestic and International Observers
Domestic and international election observer groups performed an important role during
the election period. Their judgment on the election would be influential in determining
whether the elections would be considered legitimate by the international community,
thereby allowing foreign aid to resume, permitting the vacant UN General Assembly
seat to be filled, and reopening membership in ASEAN. Three national election moni-
toring groups — the Coalition on Free and Fair Elections (COFFEL), the Committee
on Free and Fair Elections (COMFREL), and the Neutral and Impartial Committee for
Free Elections (NICFEC) — carried out ambitious and effective programs to educate
voters and to monitor the balloting and counting processes. Local groups were essential
in monitoring and reporting on the pre-election violence, intimidation, and institutional
proceedings. Domestic monitors were present at most of the nation's 12,000
pollingstations and fewer counting stations throughout the country. COFFEL,
COMFREL, and NICFEC issued thoughtful and balanced statements before and after
election day.
COMFREL's president, Thun Saray, stated two days before polling that, because of
the intimidation and violence that took place in the aftermath of the coup, the election
could not be considered "free and fair." Nevertheless, he believed that the election re-
sults should be accepted if procedures on polling day were "reasonably credible." The
domestic observers agreed that polling and counting days were generally well con-
ducted. All three groups, however, also called on the NEC to conduct thorough, impar-
tial investigations into opposition party complaints and, in fact, offered to assist the
NEC with such efforts. They condemned the post-election violence and called on all
political actors to solve their differences peacefully. 14
The most prominent international monitoring groups were the Joint International
Observer Group (JIOG), organized by the UN and European Union (EU), and the del-
egation fielded jointly by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and
the International Republican Institute. JIOG was the larger of the two, consisting of
approximately five hundred observers representing thirty-four observer missions, in-
cluding the EU, ASEAN, and bilateral delegations. NDI and IRI established a monitor-
ing presence in the country four months before the election and fielded a delegation for
election week of about sixty representatives, including staff members, from the United
States and seven other nations.
Although Cambodian press accounts emphasized perceived differences between the
two groups of observers, their final statements on the election were not far apart, nor
did they differ substantially from the statements made by domestic observers. 15 Both
groups noted that the pre-election period was violent; but JIOG concluded that "what
could be observed by us on polling and counting day was a process that was free and
fair to an extent that it enables it to reflect, in a credible way, the will of the Cambodian
people." 16 An NDI-IRI pre-election delegation issued a statement on July 14 calling the
election process "fundamentally flawed" due to pervasive intimidation and violence.
The "preliminary" NDI-IRI post-election statement, issued on July 28, two days after
the polling, commented that the voting process was "generally well administered,"
observed that the atmosphere on election day was largely "peaceful," and applauded the
Cambodian people for turning out in such high numbers on election day. At the same
time, NDI and IRI reiterated their serious concerns regarding "violence, extensive in-
timidation, unfair media access, and ruling party control of the administrative
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machinery that characterized the pre-election period" and cautioned that a final assess-
ment of the entire election process would have to await the final tabulation of results,
the processing of complaints, and the formation of the next government based on the
results of the elections. 17
To some extent, the observer groups raised more question than they resolved. How
could it be determined, for example, whether the July 1997 coup and its violent after-
math affected voting behavior? Should any elections that do not meet international
standards, because of pre-election violence, for instance, be considered unacceptable by
the international community? Political reality in large measure probably accounts for
the international monitors' view of their role. An election was about to be held under
conditions that were obviously flawed. But the opposition had agreed to participate,
albeit under international pressure.
The reaction of the U.S. government to the elections was cautious. U.S. secretary of
state Madeline Albright urged ASEAN to keep pressuring the Cambodian government
for furtherreforms. She said, "The democratic process must continue until the day
comes when Cambodians can participate in the life of their country without fear . . .
until they have a government that uses power to uplift their . . . country instead of abus-
ing it on behalf of a privileged few." 18
Negotiations for a Coalition Government
Much of the international community pressured Prince Ranariddh to return to negotiate
the National Front FUNCINPEC's participation in the Cambodian government. On
November 1 2, at the insistence of King Sihanouk, Ranariddh returned to Phnom Penh to
try to resolve the impasse that had prevented the formation of a government based on
the results of the July elections. FUNCINPEC and the Cambodian People's Party
quickly agreed to form a coalition government and to establish a new upper house of
Parliament and senate. Ranariddh would become president of the National Assembly,
and CPP stalwart Chea Sim would become head of the new senate, which would also
make him head of state in the absence of the king. The parties agreed on co-deputy
prime ministers, one from CPP and one from FUNCINPEC, and dividing government
ministries. The important ministries of interior and defense would also have co-minis-
ters. The parties also split the nine parliamentary committees, four each for
FUNCINPEC and CPP and one for the Sam Rainsy Party.
In light of the agreement to form a government, Cambodia was expected to reclaim
its seat at the UN and to be admitted to ASEAN.
Cambodia's coalition government, put into place following the United Nations Transi-
tional Authority in Cambodia-conducted elections of 1993, failed the test of time. De-
spite massive aid from the international community — $1.5 billion for UNTAC and
pledges of $1.3 billion in post-election assistance over the next five years — the demo-
cratic impetus the elections provided could not be sustained. The elections suc-
ceeded in marginalizing the Khmer Rouge, but the animosity between the coalition
partners of the new government persisted. Immediately following the 1993 elections,
neither of the coalition partners could rule alone. FUNCINPEC lacked the critical sup-
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port of the civil bureaucracy, police, courts, and much of the military, which remained
under CPP control. The CPP, on the other hand, lacked international legitimacy and,
having received only 38 percent of the total vote, also lacked a substantial segment of
domestic public support.
Initially, this mutual reliance was sufficient to hold the coalition intact.
The institutions that could have supported the new democratic dispensation, however,
failed to take root. The National Assembly, for instance, never developed the capacity to
act as an independent check on the executive branch; the press, on the whole, remained
highly partisan, and opposition newspapers were subject to harassment and intimida-
tion; civil society made substantial gains, but had neither sufficient time nor resources
to develop and mobilize domestic political constituencies for reform. Moreover, Hun
Sen correctly sensed that the international community, already fatigued by years of
assistance — first to the refugees who fled after the Vietnamese invasion and then to the
new government — longed for stability rather than democracy. Lacking international
and domestic constraints, the looming prospect of defeat at the polls led Hun Sen to
violently overthrow his coalition partner.
The 1998 elections merely affirmed the post-coup status quo. Despite the obstacles
that had been put in their path, the opposition had mounted a vigorous campaign and
made a respectable showing. It is impossible to know how much better the political
opposition might have done had the playing field been level. The pre-election period
was short and violent, though perhaps less violent than during the 1993 UNTAC elec-
tions. But unlike the 1993 elections, there were no UN peacekeepers to inform voters
that their ballots were secret and their safety assured. In the post-coup environment, the
scales were heavily weighted in favor of the CPP, and the elections were therefore fun-
damentally flawed regardless of how well the polls were administered on election day.
In retrospect, there are a few lessons that might be drawn from the Cambodian trag-
edy. First, the UNTAC period — the eighteen months between March 1992 and Sep-
tember 1993 — was too short to establish the framework for a lasting democracy. After
thirty years of civil war, the trauma of Khmer Rouge rule, and Vietnamese occupation, a
more sustained effort was needed. The 1993 elections left the power relationships be-
tween the major parties unchanged despite the CPP's electoral defeat. UNTAC failed to
demobilize the military forces of FUNCINPEC and the CPP and did not establish a
"neutral political environment" before the election. After the election, efforts to neutral-
ize and professionalize the civil bureaucracy, courts, and police might have helped to
redress the imbalance, but such efforts were precluded by UNTAC 's premature depar-
ture. UNTAC, with its wide-ranging mandate and relative acceptability by all the par-
ties, was in the best position to undertake these post-election activities.
Second, when, by the spring of 1997, it was clear that a political impasse existed and
the situation was deteriorating rapidly, the international community should have taken
firmer steps — by threatening sanctions or aid cutoffs or even by reconvening the Paris
Peace conference — to ensure that the Paris Peace Accords were observed. The inter-
national donors, however, appeared to believe that placing pressure on Hun Sen would
be inherently destabilizing. In the context of Cambodia's highly polarized society, how-
ever, the opposite was true. Only a more democratic Cambodia, where each of the par-
ties felt that they could fairly and peacefully compete for power, could lead to a
measure of stability. It was only after the grenade attack on Sam Rainsy's demonstra-
tion in April 1 997 that the international community became more assertive in its calls
for reform, and by then it was too late.
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Third, the 1998 elections should have been delayed until the conditions for meaning-
ful democratic elections had been met. The political opposition had neither the time nor
organizational resources to compete fairly in the 1998 elections. As mentioned earlier,
they were forced to contest the election before being able to repair the damage done to
their organizations by the 1997 coup. Furthermore, their workers were harassed and
intimidated and access to government-controlled electronic media was severely re-
stricted.
Elections have not brought democracy or stability to Cambodia. Much more is
clearly needed in the areas of institutional development, establishing the rule of law,
and changing the political culture to one in which all contending parties recognize that
they are subject to lawful and democratically adopted constraints. The Cambodian
people, too, must internalize the norms of political tolerance and compromise necessary
for a democratic polity. Nevertheless, elections remain an essential feature of democ-
racy. No meaningful, sustainable political reconciliation will take place until all the
parties agree to a framework for the peaceful and fair transfer of power based on the
will of the Cambodian people. 5*
Notes
1. There are several thorough accounts of the UNTAC period and the 1993 elections.
See, for example, Michael Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Man-
date (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995); Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The
Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 995); Frederick Z.
Brown, "Cambodia's Rocky Venture in Democracy," in Krishna Kumar, ed.,
Postconflict Elections, Democratization, and International Assistance (Boulder, Colo.:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998); James A. Schear, "Riding the Tiger: The United Na-
tions and Cambodia's Struggle for Peace," in William J. Durch, ed., UN Peacekeeping,
American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1996), 135-191.
2. UN document A/46/608, S/23177, Annex 5, October 30, 1991, 8-47. The UN
docu ments may also be found in the Appendix of Findlay, Cambodia, 171-207.
3. Schear, "Riding the Tiger," 176-177.
4. On UNTAC's mandate, see ibid., 142-143.
5. See Findlay, Cambodia, 81.
6. See Chapter VII, Article 90 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia (adopted
September 24, 1993), supplied by the embassy of the Kingdom of Cambodia in the
United States.
7. See "NEC Investigates Allegations of Fraud," Phnom Penh Post!, no. 16 (July 31-
August 6, 1998): 1.
8. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, 82.
9. David W. Ashley, "The Failure of Conflict Resolution in Cambodia," in Cambodia and
the International Community (New York: Asia Society, 1998, 64).
10. NDI and IRI issued two reports during this period. See Restoring Democracy in Cam-
bodia: The Difficult Road Ahead (Washington, D.C.: NDI-IRI, August 29,1997); The
Continuing Crisis in Cambodia: Obstacles to Democratic Elections (Washington, D.C.:
NDI-IRI, January 30, 1998).
11. See "Cambodia: Fair Elections Not Possible," Human Rights Watch Report 10, no. 4
(June 1998).
12. The norms largely accepted by the international community can be found in Guy S.
Goodwin-Gill, Free and Fair Elections: International Law and Practice (Geneva: Inter-
Parliamentary Union, 1 994); Carl W. Dundas, Dimensions of Free and Fair Elections:
Frameworks, Integrity, Transparency, Attributes, Monitoring (London: Common-
wealth Secretariat, 1994); UN Centre for Human Rights, Human Rights and
159
New England Journal of Public Policy
Elections: A Handbook on the Legal, Technical, and Human Rights Aspects of Elec-
tions (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1994).
13. See Memorandum to the Royal Government of Cambodia, submitted by the special
representative of the United Nations secretary-general for human rights in Cambodia
(Phnom Penh: UN Centre for Human Rights, May 13, 1998).
14. See Kay Johnson, "Group Says That Poll Could Be Credible — Not Fair," Cambodia
Daily 13, issue 43 (Sunday, July 26, 1998): 1, 9.
15. See, for example, Matthew Granger, "International Observers Taking a Tougher
Public Stance in Days before Polling," Phnom Penh Post, July 24-30,1998, 10.
The article argues that JIOG toughened its pre-election day statement in response
to NDI- IRI criticisms that past JIOG statements had ignored the effects of Hun
Sen's July 1997 coup. See also Matthew Granger, "Former Ambassador Says His
Observers Will Balance US Opinion," Phnom Penh Post, July 24-30,1998, 4.
16. Jeff Smith, "JIOG Says Poll, Tally, 'Free, Fair,'" Cambodia Daily, July 28, 1998, 1,
11.
1 7. See Preliminary Statement of the IRI-NDI Delegation to the July 16, 1998, Elections
in Cambodia, press statement available from NDI and IRI offices in Washington,
D.C.
18. Madeline Albright, quoted in "Albright Urges ASEAN to Press Cambodia," Cambodia
Daily, July 29, 1998, 8.
160
